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Democracy as the legitimating 
condition in the UK Constitution 
Abstract: The UK constitution is either theorised as a political constitution that is premised 
on the Westminster model of government or as a legal constitution that rests on moral 
principles, which the common law is said to protect. Both models conceive of democracy in 
procedural terms, and not in normative terms. However, the democratic legitimacy of laws 
stems from a complex constellation of conditions that no longer involves popular or 
parliamentary sovereignty alone. In this article, I break with the traditional account that bases 
law-making authority on the condition of procedural democracy. Instead, I argue for a 
normative conception of democracy that conditions parliamentary authority. I show that 
failure to do so amounts to a glaring omission in certain cases. 
Keywords: civil liberties, constitutional law, constitutional theory, democracy, freedom of 
expression, parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is the invariable starting point for UK 
constitutional theory. It is also the inevitable stumbling block when it comes to civil liberties 
and individual rights. Although the Human Rights Act 1998 has had a significant impact on 
administrative law, by altering the balance of power between public bodies and the courts, it 
has not significantly strengthened the constitutional protection of rights and liberties in the 
UK. Its lack of legal entrenchment renders it vulnerable to future change. Moreover, the UK 
courts interpret neither the common law nor the ECHR to protect freedom of speech as ‘the 
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matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom’.1 This reluctance 
creates a normative space for another concept, like democratic legitimacy, to take root.  
Democracy is, of course, a multifarious concept. It ‘lacks a clear narrative line and 
conspicuously fails to carry its own meaning clearly on the surface’.2 It also loses its value if 
it is reduced to its literal meaning. Conversely, the temptation to open the concept up to 
endless contestation or to over-burden it with normative goals must also be resisted. The 
added value of democracy as a concept in constitutional discourse only becomes apparent if it 
can be presented as the conceptual starting point or the ‘indispensable condition’ on which 
the viability of all other constitutional concepts, including parliamentary sovereignty, depend. 
As Sartori notes: 
‘Up until the 1940s people knew what democracy was and either liked it or rejected it; 
since then we all claim to like democracy but no longer know (understand, agree) 
what it is. We characteristically live, then, in an age of confused democracy. That 
“democracy” obtains several meanings is something we can live with. But if 
“democracy” can mean just anything, that is too much’.3 
If democracy cannot mean anything, it must still mean something. I will use this 
article to explore three questions. First, in what situation does the absence of a concrete 
understanding of democracy become an inescapable problem for constitutional law? Second, 
to what extent are the existing constitutional models democratically deficient? Third, what 
precisely must democracy prescribe as the indispensable condition for political legitimacy?  
                                                          
1
 Palko v Connecticut 302 U.S. 319 at 327 (1937), per Cardozo J. 
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 J Dunne Setting the People Free: the Story of Democracy (London: Atlantic Books, 2005) p 137. 
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The inescapable problem 
In this section I will identify three categories that illustrate the problems that stem from an 
absolutist conception of parliamentary sovereignty. The normative gap that a legal conception 
of democracy could close becomes apparent only in the final category. The first category 
consists of largely hypothetical and absurd examples. They imagine legislation that condemns 
all red-haired males to death,
4
 requires the killing of ‘all blue eyed babies’,5 or 
disenfranchises or discriminates against a particular group on arbitrary grounds.
6
 Lord Hope 
summarily dismissed these examples as unhelpful:  
‘Parliamentary sovereignty is an empty principle if legislation is passed which is so 
absurd or so unacceptable that the populace at large refuses to recognise it as law’.7 
Most scholars prefer to dismiss such examples as ‘unlikely, immoral or undesirable 
things which no one wishes it to do’.8 In truth, a state that mandated the killing of blue-eyed 
babies would not be a legitimate state, let alone a democratic one. It would, in common 
parlance, be a rogue or a failed state. For that reason these examples do not even begin to 
address normative questions of democracy.  
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 AW Bradley, KD Ewing & CJS Knight Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Pearson, 16
th
 edn, 
2015) p 73. 
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 This particular favourite has been around since the days of L Stephen The Science of Ethics (London: Smith, 
Elder & Co., 1882) p 132 and AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 
London, 10
th
 edn, 1959) p 79. See now: M Elliott ‘Legislative Supremacy in a Multidimensional Constitution’, 
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 See examples in (R)Jackson v Her Majesty’s Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, Lord Steyn at [102]; 
Baroness Hale at [159]; and D Oliver ‘Parliament and the Courts: A Pragmatic (or Principled) Defence of the 
Sovereignty of Parliament’ in A. Horne et al (eds) Parliament and the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2013) pp 314-315. 
7
 Jackson v Attorney General, above n 6, at [120]. 
8
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The second category involves violations of civil liberties with a national security or 
public safety dimension. Within this category are high-profile speech cases, such as Tisdall,
9
 
Ponting,
10
 Spycatcher,
11
 and Shayler,
12
 which involve criminal proceedings in the context of 
secrets, spies, and whistleblowers.
13
 Other examples within this category involve indefinite 
detention, arbitrary arrests, broad police powers, data retention and surveillance powers. 
These examples challenge a state committed to civil liberties and the rule of law, i.e. the 
technical administrative law language of rationality, proportionality, and ECHR-compliancy. 
They clearly also have implications for the democratic quality of a state. The House of Lords 
Constitution Committee, for instance, recognised that the erosion of privacy ‘weakens the 
constitutional foundations on which democracy and good governance have traditionally been 
based in this country’.14 But these examples do not determine the democratic quality of a 
state: even a non-democratic state can desist from torture, respect due process, and protect 
privacy.
15
 
The third and final category involves violations of civil liberties without a security or 
safety dimension. The first few years after the HRA came into force saw the cases of Percy,
16
 
Norwood,
17
 and Hammond.
18 
These cases were picked up by civil liberties scholars because 
in each of these cases the individual’s right to free expression had been restricted on ground 
of a pressing social need.
19
 Hammond involved a street preacher in Bournemouth who held 
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up a sign bearing the words ‘Stop Immorality’, ‘Stop Homosexuality’, and ‘Stop 
Lesbianism’, but who did not incite violence. Mr Hammond was arrested, charged, and fined 
(upheld on appeal) for an offence under s 5 Public Order Act 1986. The court found that the 
link between homosexuality, lesbianism, and immorality was capable of being insulting and 
of causing harassment, alarm, or distress to a person standing nearby.  
To be sure, the law has changed since the triplet of Percy, Norwood, and Hammond 
were decided. The wording of s 5 at the time made it an offence to use ‘threatening, abusive 
or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour’ or to display ‘any writing, sign or 
other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting’ within the hearing or 
sight of a person ‘likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby’. After a high 
profile campaign and a governmental defeat in the House of Lords, s 57 of the Crime and 
Courts Act 2013 removed the word ‘insulting’ in ss 5(1) and 6(4) of the Public Order Act 
1986: the crime now requires ‘threatening or abusive’ words or behaviour. According to the 
CPS, ‘the amendment is intended to enhance the protection of the right to freedom of 
expression under Art 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)’.20 It might 
therefore be claimed that cases like Hammond would not be decided the same way today. 
However, three notes of caution need to be inserted.  
First, both s 4(1) (fear or provocation of violence) and s 4A(1) (intentional 
harassment, alarm or distress) Public Order Act 1986 continue to proscribe ‘insulting’ 
behaviour. In other words, where the insulting words or behaviour are planned and malicious, 
a person could still be guilty of a criminal offence.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘Criminalising free speech?’ (2011) 9 Crim L R pp 705-711; A Geddis ‘Free Speech Martyrs or Unreasonable 
Threats to Social Peace? - “Insulting” Expression and Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986’ [2003] PL 853- 
874; D Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest: Rights and Regulation in the Human Rights Act Era (Oxford: 
Hart, 2010) pp 224-230. 
20
 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/#Section_5 [last accessed: May 2017]. 
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Second, a court can still punish identical conduct as ‘abusive’. After the government 
agreed to amend s 5, the then Home Secretary Theresa May told MPs: 
‘Looking at past cases, the Director of Public Prosecutions could not identify any 
where the behaviour leading to a conviction could not be described as “abusive” as 
well as “insulting”. He has stated that “the word ‘insulting’ could safely be removed 
without the risk of undermining the ability of the CPS to bring prosecutions.’21 
To illustrate this point, in Abdul v DPP
22
 the Crown Court had convicted the 
defendants of a s 5 Public Order Act 1986 offence. The protesters in question had shouted 
‘burn in hell’, ‘murderers’, and ‘baby killers’ at soldiers returning home from Iraq. On appeal 
to the High Court, the question was whether their conviction for these utterances was 
compatible with Art 10 ECHR. It is of interest that the soldiers themselves were not bothered 
‘one jot’ by the protesters,23 and that the police made their arrests not during the 
demonstration but only months later after having reviewed film footage of the events. 
Nonetheless, the High Court found that ‘the words shouted by the defendants were both 
abusive and insulting’.24 The first instance judge had, according to Gross LJ, carefully 
balanced freedom of expression against ‘a very clear threat to public order’,25 and reached the 
right conclusion that prosecution was a proportionate response.
26
 Davis J added the freedoms 
of expression and assembly are subject to ‘duties and responsibilities’.27 Both judges agree 
that the defendants’ actions had gone ‘well beyond legitimate expressions of protest’.28 
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 House of Commons, Hansard debates, 14 January 2013, column 642. 
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 Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 (Admin). 
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 Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 at [19]. 
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 Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 at [29] per Gross LJ (emphasis added). 
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 Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 at [52]. 
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Third, even without s 5 POA, prosecutors have access to ample legislative provisions 
to deal with ‘public order’ and ‘communication’ offences.29 Section 127(1)(a) 
Communications Act 2003 creates an offence if three conditions are met: i) a message; ii) 
that is grossly offensive; iii) is sent by means of a public electronic communications network. 
Lord Bingham helpfully sets out the legislative history of the provision in DPP v Collins.
30
 
The purpose of the provision is to prohibit the sending of a grossly offensive communication 
via a public communications service. A letter that was personally delivered through a 
letterbox would, accordingly, not fall within this legislation – although it may be covered by 
s.1 Malicious Communications Act 1988.  
The majority of cases dealing with bullies, trolls, and stalkers on social media 
websites involve s 127.
31
 In an attempt to stem the rise of s 127 prosecutions, the then DPP 
Keir Starmer issued guidelines in 2012, which sought to establish a high threshold for 
launching criminal action against spontaneously written digital communications. Most 
notably, he made the following statement on the nature of offence: 
‘The distinction [between offensive and grossly offensive] is an important one and not 
easily made. Context and circumstances are highly relevant and as the European 
Court of Human Rights observed in the case of Handyside v UK (1976), the right to 
freedom of expression includes the right to say things or express opinions “…that 
offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population”.’32 
                                                          
29
 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/ and 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_offences/#an11/ [last accessed: May 2017]. 
30
 DPP v Collins [2006] UKHL 40; (2006) 4 All ER 602 at [6]. 
31
 L Edwards ‘Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003: Threat or Menace?’ LSE Media Policy Project 
blog, 19 October 2012.  
32
 DPP statement on Tom Daley case and social media prosecutions, 20 September 2012. 
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But mere guidelines do not resolve the issue, especially when the issue relates to the 
clarity, certainty, and predictability of the fundamental right of freedom of expression. How 
strong is the protection of speech in the UK? Is it is possible to identify 
‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, 
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials’?33 
The notion that free speech is ‘bred in the bone of common law’,34 or that ‘people are 
free to say and print what they like’ at common law,35 is disputable. It clearly did not apply to 
Mr Lemon, who was prosecuted for blasphemy at English common law in the 1970s,
36
 or Mr 
Hammond.
37
 In any event, trial courts usually refer to Art 10 ECHR (freedom of expression). 
The potency of Art 10 ECHR, however, is destabilised by a number of qualifications, 
including interests of national security, territorial integrity, public safety, the prevention of 
disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, and the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others. Legal stability is further undermined when trial courts invert the operation of 
Art 10 ECHR, as happened in Hammond and Abdul. Instead of recognising the individual’s 
right to expression, which ought to persist unless and until the state can justify a limitation, 
the courts began by asking whether the defendant’s conduct was insulting and likely to 
harass, annoy or distress bystanders. If that was the case, the courts asked a second question, 
namely whether the conduct might nonetheless have been ‘reasonable’ or ‘legitimate’ under 
Art 10 ECHR. By erroneously privileging public peacefulness over freedom of expression, 
criminal convictions have been presented as a necessary limit on the right to speak under Art 
                                                          
33
 New York Times v Sullivan 376 US.. 254 (1964), 270, per Justice Black. 
34
 R v Criminal Central Court, ex parte Bright [2000] EWHC 560 (QB), [2001] 2 All ER 244 at [87], per Judge 
LJ. 
35
 K Ewing The Bonfire of the Liberties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 138. 
36
 R v Lemon [1979] QB 10, CA; upheld on appeal [1979] AC 617, HL. 
37
 See generally E Barendt ‘Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom under the Human Rights Act 1998’ 
(2009) 84(3) Indiana LJ 851-866, 851: ‘English law has traditionally taken little or no notice of freedom of 
speech. A right to free speech (or expression) was not generally recognized by the common law […]’. 
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10(2) ECHR. Davis J casual remark in Abdul v DPP, that s 5 Public Order Act 1986 is 
‘obviously…compatible with the Convention’,38 is symptomatic of that approach. However, 
the more important question is whether the criminalisation of behaviour that is not of itself 
violent, but is threatening, abusive, insulting or disorderly, is also necessary in a democratic 
society. 
Freedom of expression is not only vital as an individual right, but as a constitutive 
element of democratic society. According to Weale, the values of democracy values are ‘best 
understood in terms of the protection and promotion of common interests constrained by 
political equality and in conditions of human fallibility’.39 In that context, the common 
interest commands possibilities for dissent and difference: ‘dissent does not undermine a 
society but underpins it’.40 A legal concept democracy must, therefore, guarantee free speech 
– not as a constitutionally-guaranteed individual right, but as a political or public right, and as 
a condition of democratic legitimacy.  
Unfortunately, as we have seen, UK courts have tended not to approach freedom of 
expression of individual dissenters with the same degree of principle and conviction as, say, 
First Amendment jurisprudence in the USA. Domestic courts view deeply inflammatory 
speech as pernicious, and as promoting distrust, suspicion, and violence between different 
social groups. They have indiscriminately constrained or criminalised the articulation of 
offensive and extremist ideas that fall short of criminal incitement. The cases discussed above 
are not isolated ones. Philip Johnston’s opening chapter starts with the striking claim that 
‘more people are being jailed or arrested in Britain today for what they think, believe and say 
than at any time since the eighteenth century’.41 Brice Dickson claims that the attitude of the 
                                                          
38
 Abdul v DPP at [55]. 
39
 A Weale Democracy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2
nd
 edn, 2007) pp xviii-xix.  
40
 N Bobbio The Future of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) p 60. 
41
 P Johnston Feel Free to Say It: Threats to Freedom of Speech in Britain Today (London: Civitas, 2013) p 7. 
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House of Lords and UK Supreme Court towards freedom of expression ‘cannot be regarded 
as particularly fervent’. He attributes this to the absence of constitutional guarantees as well 
as to ‘a strain of conservatism on the part of judges in our top court, most of whom do not 
seem to view free speech as deserving of extra-special protection.’42 Eric Barendt finds no 
evidence that the HRA has radically altered the legal protection of free speech, and little 
evidence that UK courts treat freedom of expression ‘as the starting point; they have not 
always asked whether the restrictions on its exercise were necessary to safeguard public order 
or the other end for which they were imposed’.43 James Weinstein concludes that the English 
right to free speech ‘is both too weak and too indeterminate to adequately protect the public 
expression of ideas that “offend, shock or disturb” dominant opinion’.44 This state of affairs 
should be of concern not only to anyone with an interest in constitutional law, but also to 
anyone with an interest in democracy and legitimacy.  
The next two sections will reveal the democracy deficit in the two rival constitutional 
models. The UK’s constitutional traditions, concepts, and vocabulary developed to describe a 
functioning, balanced, and liberal constitution. Ideas of democracy and universal freedom 
were ‘invariably not forged afresh but rather tentatively grafted onto a pre-existing society 
that had been designed for the few’.45 Although the origin of nineteenth century concepts, 
such as ‘sovereignty’, ‘constitution’, ‘rule of law’, ‘judicial review’, and ‘separation of 
powers’, is pre-democratic, they complement our understanding of democracy today: an Act 
of Parliament is the highest source of law, and everyone is subject to the same laws that are 
interpreted by an independent judiciary. But that still leaves a gap in relation to the 
recognition of basic rights in terms of ‘democratic legitimacy’, the common good, or 
                                                          
42
 B Dickson Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) p 
280. 
43
 Barendt above n 37, p 866. 
44
 Weinstein, above n 19, p 37.  
45
 C Gearty Liberty and Security (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013) p 4. 
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‘political’ and ‘public’ rights. The literature on UK constitutional law does not usually assess 
legitimacy with reference to such specifically democratic criteria. The two main models are 
both culpable for not adapting constitutional theory to fit the requirements of a modern 
democratic state.  
Democratic deficiency I: the political constitution 
The Westminster model of government encapsulates the so-called political constitution.
46
 
This model conceives of democracy as electoral representation, which is ordinarily deemed to 
legitimise all parliamentary legislation. The political constitution is rooted in the nineteenth-
century concept of representative or parliamentary government. Its central presuppositions, 
such as the continuing sovereignty of Parliament, a procedural conception of the rule of law, 
and basic civil liberties pre-date the arrival of mass democracy. They reached their high point 
during the late Victorian constitution. Ultimate legal authority was still divided amongst the 
three estates of Parliament, and the franchise, although extended, was not yet universal. 
Although civil liberties expanded ratione personae, they remained fragile ratione materiae 
due to their lack of constitutional entrenchment.
47
 ‘There are not, under English domestic 
law, any fundamental constitutional rights that are immune from legislative change’.48  
Anthony Bradley noted accurately in 2011 that the debates based on the model of the 
political constitution still revolve around a static and immutable understanding of 
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 JAG Griffith ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1; A Tomkins ‘In Defence of the Political 
Constitution’ (2002) 22(1) OJLS 157-175; R Bellamy Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); G Webber and G Gee, ‘What 
Is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30 OJLS 273; Special Issue in (2013) 14 German LJ No. 12. 
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 KD Ewing and CA Gearty Freedom under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in Modern Britain (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1990); and The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain 1914-
1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
48
 R (Hooper) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 29, [2005] 1 WLR 1681 at [92], per 
Lord Scott.  
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parliamentary sovereignty and a subordinate role for the courts.
49
 The conceptual starting 
point remains strikingly absolutist and gives rise to a legitimate concern about potentially 
oppressive and undemocratic outcomes: the legal principle of sovereignty by which 
Parliament provides unconstrained legal authority for governmental policy choices
50
 is 
connected to the ‘political principle that in a democracy there should be no legal limit to the 
wishes of the people’.51  
This absolutist premise requires scrutiny. The legal principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty was born in the seventeenth century prior to the advent of mass democracy. As 
Bernard Manin notes, universal suffrage expanded the body of the electorate without 
transforming the undemocratic nature of the constitution: ‘…there has been no significant 
change in the institutions regulating the selection of representatives and the influence of the 
popular will on their decisions once in office’.52 The purpose of the Reform Acts of 1832, 
1867, and 1884 was to resist the kinds of democracy sought by Radicals and Chartists by 
focussing reform on parliamentary procedure and electoral districts.
53
 Ironically, 
parliamentary sovereignty received a boost by the growth in franchise to the surprise of many 
observers who were sceptical as to its operation under universal suffrage.
54
 Popular 
sovereignty was effectively absorbed by and channelled through Parliament. This had two 
consequences. First, the entire reform process from 1832 onwards occurred in the name of 
                                                          
49
 A Bradley ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament – Form or Substance?’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds.) The 
Changing Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7
th
 edn, 2011) pp 67-68. 
50
 G Marshall Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) p 41. 
51
 K.D. Ewing, ‘The Resilience of the Political Constitution’ [2013] 14(12) German Law Journal 2111-2136, p 
2118; Gordon above n 5, pp 42, 46. 
52
 B Manin The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p 
236. 
53
 N Gash ‘The Social and Political Background to the Three British Nineteenth Century Reform Acts’ in AM 
Birke and K Kluxen (eds.) British and German Parliamentarism (München: K.G. Saur, 1985).  
54
 See MJ Horwitz ‘Why is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical?’ (1997) 17 OJLS 551-586, p 561: 
‘…if the central question for Blackstone is how to reconcile the rule of law with parliamentary supremacy, the 
central question for all legal thinkers after the French Revolution is how a theory of parliamentary supremacy 
will work under a regime of universal suffrage’. 
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parliamentary government, which ‘fostered the conviction or delusion that the will of the 
nation could be expressed only through elected representatives’.55 Second, with a more 
inclusive franchise, democracy became a convenient concept for the ruling elites who 
appropriated and contained the concept in order to ‘counteract the illusion that any random 
act was now possible’.56 But it was too late. In the UK at least, parliamentary sovereignty was 
now so powerful that it became associated with a variant of absolute power that gave rise to 
concerns about ‘elective despotism’, a ‘plebiscitary dictatorship’,57 and Parliament ‘legibus 
solutum’.58  
The absence of normative benchmarks to constrain the omnipotent Parliament is also 
‘unfortunately absolutely characteristic of English writing on constitutional law’.59 
Constitutional law, in spite of its common usage, is ‘not a technical phrase of English law’.60 
It is silent on governing principles underlying the constitution,
61
 it does not address questions 
regarding the social foundations of law’s legitimacy,62 and it lacks the higher law quality of 
modern constitutional documents. The core of the political constitution has not changed since 
De Lolme wrote that ‘the legislature can change the constitution, as God created the light’.63 
To this premise were added the nineteenth century desiderata of representative and 
parliamentary government. This was followed by the twentieth century view that a 
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 AV Dicey Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth 
Century (London: Macmillan, 1905) p 42.  
56
 N Luhmann, Die Politik der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000) p 97. 
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 A Hamilton, J Jay, and J Madison The Federalist (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
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Collins, 1978) pp  9-11, 20-1; F Hayek Law, Legislation and Liberty (London: Routledge, 1982) 348. 
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375.  
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 E Barendt An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p 5.  
60
 FW Maitland The Constitutional History of England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908) p 527. 
61
 S Sedley ‘The Sound of Silence: Constitutional Law Without a Constitution’ (1994) 110 LQR 270-291, 270. 
62
 R Cotterell Law’s Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) p 
243. 
63
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& J. Robinson, 1784), Book II, Ch.3. 
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constitution should foster political opportunities for individuals on formally equal terms 
through the processes of representation and effective participation with the purpose of 
promoting sound governmental decisions.
64
 The democratic process, narrowly conceived, 
allows the electorate ‘to turn out any government that it does not like’.65 For Bellamy, that 
‘democratic process is the constitution’.66 In other words, the constitutional view of 
democracy is purely procedural. But as Ewing acknowledges, the democratic process is not 
the same as a democratic constitution.
67
 
The political constitution and the Westminster model of government prioritise the 
source of the decision and presume the legitimacy of majoritarian decision-making. Contrary 
to the central tenets of Western constitutional theory nothing is protected from the ordinary 
legislative processes, and everything is ‘up for grabs’.68 Jeffrey Goldsworthy looks 
favourably upon the unlimited nature of the political constitution: ‘[procedurally] democratic 
decision-making is facilitated, and reasonably just statutes are enacted’.69 Richard Bellamy 
takes the same view on democratic rule: ‘…the demos should be free to redefine the nature of 
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Press, 7
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their democracy whenever they want and not be tied to any given definition.’70 Intricate 
questions about justice and human rights are, therefore, not to be resolved by recourse to first 
principles, but by the ‘opinion of a majority of the people of those elected to represent 
them’.71 The principal remedy lies in ministerial responsibility to Parliament, which in the 
late Victorian age still conformed to the Burkean ideal of a lower house with independently-
minded MPs, but which today has been transformed by party discipline and the whip 
system.
72
 
Even Stephen Gardbaum’s synthetic account of a ‘third model’ of constitutionalism 
ultimately rests on a purely procedural conception of democracy that assigns ultimate 
decision-making power to ordinary majority vote in the legislature.
73
 He views as 
‘compelling’ the argument that a legislative majority should ‘trump’ the views of a judicial 
majority. The political constitution regards the enactment of oppressive and undemocratic 
legislation as repugnant only to ‘moral principle’.74 The legitimacy question has always been 
brushed off as a non-issue. Extreme cases have been kept at bay by ‘the sweet reasonableness 
of MPs and their constituents’,75 ‘because Parliament has not been extreme’,76 and because 
Acts of Parliament ‘are rarely obviously and egregiously unjust’.77 In short, the UK 
constitution assumes that ‘the worst will not happen in the first place’.78  
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The cases discussed in the third category above are clearly not ‘the worst’ that can 
happen. For reasons mentioned at the start I have chosen not to discuss the UK’s attempts to 
allow the government to gag a newspaper
79
 and a former spy;
80
 to ban all homosexuals from 
serving in the military;
81
 to indefinitely detain foreign terrorist suspects;
82
 to criminalise 
speech that ‘encourages’ terrorism, even if the person making the statement does not intend 
to encourage terrorism’;83 to ban non-violent political organisations;84 to sanction some of the 
most sweeping surveillance powers in the Western world.
85
 And even these examples stop 
short of a particular Rubicon that some of the most senior judges think Parliament should not 
cross, namely a legislative attempt to remove government action affecting individual rights 
from judicial scrutiny.
86
 But Hammond and Abdul do reveal some home truths about the UK 
constitution. Although free speech is routinely hailed as a hallmark of democratic society,
87
 it 
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is ‘residual’ to the common law,88 and far from being recognised as an indispensable 
condition of legitimacy.  
In the end, the political constitution explains nothing more than the Westminster way 
of doing politics.
89
 John Austin’s legal positivism, H.L.A. Hart’s analytical jurisprudence, 
A.V. Dicey’s conservative normativism, and John Griffith’s functionalism all define law and 
legality in purely formal terms. Their normative blindness is self-serving. They perpetuate the 
political constitution by focussing only on the source of power. They favour representative 
and responsible government over substantive democratic government. They define 
arbitrariness narrowly as the absence of procedure. They equate legitimacy with legality. 
Their failure to grasp political questions as constitutional questions, and questions of legality 
as questions of legitimacy, baffles continental commentators, yet is venerated domestically as 
reflecting the flexible and living constitution.  
UK constitutional law has not produced a normative account of democracy beyond 
practical decision-making. Without limits on popular sovereignty, without ground rules, with 
‘everything up for grabs’, democracy becomes wholly incidental to the political constitution. 
Democracy collapses into the recapitulation of the status quo: whatever happens in a 
democracy is democratic. On this account, Lord Sumption’s statement that ‘Parliament may 
do many things which undermine the democratic element of our constitution’,90 and Lord 
Steyn’s concern in Jackson regarding the enactment of ‘oppressive and wholly undemocratic 
legislation’,91 are contradictions in terms. Such a relativistic account views the procedural 
conditions of periodic and competitive elections and effective, equal, and universal 
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participation as the necessary and sufficient conditions of democracy, which leaves a 
normative account of democracy under-determined, under-theorised, and under-valued.  
Democratic deficiency II: the common law constitution 
The artifice of the common law constitution has been developed in opposition to the political 
constitution. It is animated by similar questions that form the backdrop of the present article: 
what are the limits of legislative supremacy and what are the limits of the practice of judicial 
obedience to statute? In an attempt to counter orthodoxy with orthodoxy, this model rejects 
the doctrine of legislative supremacy in favour of the ancient common law tradition, which is 
re-imagined as a higher-order ersatz constitution.
92
 The common law, it is claimed, contains a 
set of moral principles, which are transformed into law through the exercise of ‘artificial 
reason’.93 Unformalised and undeclared, the moral principles are said to unite all common 
law jurisdictions and are said to be immune from judicial and parliamentary abrogation.
94
 
However, the invocation of mere morality to limit Parliament has meant that common 
lawyers since Coke and Hale have had to accept that Parliament retains the formal legal 
power to limit freedom and act oppressively. In the final analysis, the common law advances 
no more than a moral argument about what Parliament ought not to do, and not a 
constitutional argument about what Parliament cannot do.  
Trevor Allan argues that an extensive conception of the rule of law acts as ‘a 
constitutional principle of real importance, capable of moderating the influence of 
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majoritarian politics, especially in times of emergency or stress’.95 The claims of the common 
law offer an alternative account of UK constitutional law. Formal equality is replaced with a 
substantive account that includes moral-turned-legal principles of the common law, such as 
equality, rationality, proportionality, fairness, and basic rights.
96
 Judges are elevated from 
their previously subordinate role to guardians of the common law constitution and of 
democracy, who assess the content of individual rights with reference to moral and ethical 
principles.
97
 And the common law constitution creates a space for liberal rights and limits on 
legislative authority – in other words, the kind of constitutional debate which the finality of 
sovereignty in the political constitution forecloses by treating it as irrelevant, unnecessary, 
and a waste of political resources.
98
  
However, the common law constitution continues to adhere to a pre-democratic and 
constitutional form that accepts Parliament’s ability to limit freedom by legislation. Allan 
undoubtedly advances constitutional discourse by connecting parliamentary sovereignty, the 
rule of law, and separation of powers to the world of politics and morality, which he regards 
as the pillars of liberty, justice, democracy, and legality.
99
 In so doing, he replaces the 
political constitution with a moral constitution.
100
 The claim that the common law is the 
judicially-recognised source of parliamentary sovereignty becomes not only factually correct 
(courts, public authorities, and private individuals obey Acts of Parliament) but also morally 
desirable: sovereignty ought to reflect democratic notions of equality as well as a constitution 
‘rooted in fundamental moral values’.101  
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Drawing on Lon L. Fuller’s theory of moral law that respects the demands of human 
dignity, Allan co-opts liberty and justice to infuse law with moral legitimacy and appeals to 
the reader’s ‘moral and political judgement’.102 The law does not command obedience 
because of its source, e.g. parliamentary sovereignty, but because of its substance, which 
derives from i) the moral integrity of legislation and ii) personal responsibility and 
judgement.
103
 In shifting the rule of recognition from a source-based to a content-based 
conception, Allan concludes that ‘the sovereignty of Parliament is only a manifestation of the 
sovereignty of law’.104 Statute law is a composition of a ‘present tense’ interpretation105 of 
both the text and of the principles of the common law, which makes it in part ‘a product of 
our moral judgement’.106 
It is an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of analysing the constitution through 
the prism of analytical jurisprudence, and in particular the relationship between law and 
morality, that the key concepts of rule of law, legitimacy, democracy, liberty, and free speech 
all remain under-developed. Although Allan asserts the rule of law as a ‘constitutional 
principle of real importance’ that preserves individual autonomy and independence, on closer 
reading it amounts to no more than a guarantee against arbitrary interference.
107
 As a 
reviewer of the book notes, Allan’s conception of ‘legitimacy is thicker than mere legality, 
but is nevertheless a thin legitimacy’.108 The objections in the previous section 
notwithstanding, the idea of democracy is ‘clearly related’ to parliamentary sovereignty,109 
which aligns Allan with the dominant tradition. Three presuppositions contribute to the 
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weakness of the common law model. First, Allan accepts the principle that ‘a political 
majority may legitimately impose its will on a dissenting minority’ – he questions only the 
extent.
110
 Second, with the political constitutionalists, he accepts that parliamentary 
democracy and majoritarianism ‘are the appropriate means for settling the content of law’.111 
Third, he defines liberty in negative terms as that which protects ‘a private sphere of thought, 
deliberation, and action consonant with his dignity as a free and independent citizen’.112 This 
allows Allan to endorse ‘draconian restrictions on personal liberty’ on grounds of overriding 
interests of public safety
113
 and with the aid of ‘appropriately rigorous requirements of due 
process or procedural fairness’.114 Even on a key question, whether Parliament could 
expressly curtail freedom of expression at election time, Allan offers only a weak response, 
saying it would be ‘a matter of opinion’.115 Such subjectivism and relativism hardly amount 
to a principled defence of ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ speech as an essential feature 
of a liberal democratic state.
116
 
Allan concludes that egregious legislation (such as bills of attainder or statutes 
permitting the killing of all blue eyed babies) would not qualify as ‘law’ due to the absence of 
‘generality’: This response provides further evidence of Allan’s thin conception of 
legitimacy: ‘generality’, ‘due process’, and ‘procedural fairness’ are criteria of the procedural 
rule of law conception. Allan invokes standard administrative law terminology when he 
declares that such legislation would be ‘wholly unreasonable or irrational [and] cannot 
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qualify as a valid law’.117 Contrary to Allan’s argument, this technical objection does not 
suffice to ‘elucidate the features of what (in common with most of our fellow citizens) we 
take to be a legitimate scheme of government, worthy of our attention and loyalty’.118 
To the contrary, the fixation on providing legalistic responses to political problems 
inadvertently plays into the hands of, say, the US Supreme Court in its disreputable Dred 
Scott decision. In that case the Court ruled that the Missouri Compromise (1820), which had 
declared free all territories acquired after the creation of the United States, was 
unconstitutional. The US Supreme Court reached this conclusion on the ground that 
Congress’s prohibition of slave-holding in the Western territories deprived Mr Sandford of 
his slave property without due process of law.
119
 Constitutionally, the decision is problematic 
for the absence of judicial deference and the failure to presume statutory validity. From a 
democratic standpoint, however, the decision stands out for its violations of substantive 
principles, such as liberty and equality. 
The common lawyers’ equation of the legal constitution with a moral constitution is 
premised on an understanding of public law as ‘rationalist metaphysics’ that reveals itself as 
an ‘aesthetic preference, not an epistemological advance’.120 This approach fails to 
understand the constitution as a site of political contestation. Instead of justifying claims 
about parliamentary sovereignty on grounds of history or principles of morality, they ought 
instead to be ‘rooted in an appreciation of the nature of the contemporary political 
condition’.121 For Loughlin it means appreciating the autonomy of the political sphere and of 
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droit politique. In the next section, I argue that it means appreciating the requirements of 
democracy. 
Democracy as the legitimating condition 
The existing constitutional models based on parliamentary sovereignty and the common law 
fail in their accounts of democracy. The political constitution simultaneously under-theorizes 
democracy, by reducing it to an electoral condition or majoritarian procedure, and 
overextends it by treating popular and parliamentary sovereignty as legally limitless. Without 
democratic guarantees, freedom includes the freedom to change or abolish the social and 
legal order. The constitution does not contain pre-determined rules, but simply facilitates the 
process of making new rules or keeping existing ones. Democracy’s key index is fairness of 
procedure, which too is subordinated to Parliament’s overriding legislative authority.  
The common law constitution at least recognises that democracy contains biases in favour of 
individual freedoms and against arbitrary government and, insofar as its form is republican, 
against political domination. These biases potentially clash with the prevailing conceptions of 
sovereignty as absolute, of the constitution as political, and of democracy as purely 
procedural. The common law’s account today is distinctly liberal and moral, but it is not 
distinctly democratic. 
By contrast, I propose an assessment that enquires into the extent to which statutes, 
policy, and case law support an ideal of politically active citizenship. In a seminal speech 
marking the bicentennial of the US Constitution in 1987, Thurgood Marshall, the first 
African American member of the US Supreme Court, gave credit not to the ‘defective’ vision 
of the founding fathers, but ‘to those who refused to acquiesce in outdated notions of 
24 
 
“liberty,” “justice,” and “equality,” and who strived to better them’.122 In the same mould, 
UK constitutional scholars need to supplement their established criteria of legal validity with 
different conditions of political legitimacy. Those who seek to justify the decisions in 
Hammond, Abdul and similar cases by virtue of their legal consistency with the Public Order 
Act 1986 fail to notice that these decisions are unjust, wrong-headed, and not just 
unnecessary in but incompatible with a democratic society.  
Without the connection between formal legality and substantive legitimacy, the 
absolutist conceptions of parliamentary sovereignty and popular democracy become 
indistinguishable from Franz Neumann’s definition of dictatorship as ‘the rule of a person or 
a group of persons who arrogate to themselves and monopolize power in the state, exercising 
it without restraint’.123 The Westminster model ironically ends up sharing the same starting 
point of legally unlimited power as dictatorship. It is this coupling of absolute parliamentary 
sovereignty with a minimalist conception of democracy as electoral and majoritarian that 
gives rise to the tension between legality and legitimacy that underpins oppressive law and 
policy.  
Three steps need to be made in order for the UK to embrace a concept of democracy 
that transcends its electoral-representative starting point. First, democracy must not be 
relativized as a ‘complex’ and ‘contested’ concept. The claim that democracy defies 
definition and is susceptible to wholly open-ended interpretations is a widely-accepted truism 
that ought to be rejected as false.
124
 The rule of law is a similarly complex and contested 
concept. Without agreement on its meaning, it is perfectly possible, and indeed is a current 
trend, for authoritarian regimes to proffer formal acceptance of the baselines of the rule of 
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law (legal certainty and stability over economic rights) and basic democracy (elections, 
representation, and majoritarianism) but to reject openly the requirements of civil rights and 
political freedoms.
125
 
In a second step, democracy needs to be distinguished from precepts held in common 
with liberalism, principally equality and freedom. First, can equality be shown to be distinctly 
democratic? Its negative and formal sense privileges a purely abstract and civic conception to 
the detriment of material (social and economic) interests. Material equality, however, could 
also be realised in non-democratic states. For Nadia Urbinati, therefore, formal political 
equality is the reference point in relation to which citizens assess the political process of 
democratic representation.
126
 She distinguishes two kinds of formal equality, already present 
in Athens. Isonomia relates to strict equality before the law, which is satisfied through 
representation and the rule of law, and may also be found in non-democracies.
127
 Isegoria, on 
the other hand, concerns an equal right to access the political assemblies and to support or 
oppose laws or policies. This conception concerns judgement and interpretation in complex 
and plural societies.
128
 It relies on participation and active citizenship. As a result, ‘this 
equality is exquisitely political and democratic; in fact, it exists only in a democracy’.129 For 
Urbinati, therefore, democratic equality is political equality, i.e. participation and active 
citizenship, which provides the link with freedom.  
Second, is ‘freedom’ a distinctly democratic concept? The neo-Kantian ideal 
manifests itself, according to Hans Kelsen, in the historical ‘struggle for democracy’, which 
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he interprets as a ‘struggle for political freedom; that is, for popular participation in the 
legislature and executive’.130 Franz Neumann also places ‘the activist element of political 
freedom’ at the heart of the democratic political system, the essence of which does not lie in 
majoritarian decision-making, ‘but in the making of politically responsible decisions’ and in 
‘large-scale social changes maximising the freedom of man’.131 According to Giovanni 
Sartori, freedom is the constitutive element of liberal democracy, although not necessarily of 
democracy as such.
132
 In other words, these theorists collapse a democratic conception of 
freedom into a liberal conception. Unlike Urbinati, who privileges equality over liberty, 
Sartori claims that liberal democracies strive to achieve ‘equality through liberty’:133 ‘From 
liberty we are free to go on to equality; from equality we are not free to get back to liberty’.134 
But both Urbinati and Sartori reduce democracy to the liberal values of political equality and 
individual freedom, neither of which are, however, distinctly democratic.  
The final liberal account of democracy stems from Ronald Dworkin, who argues that 
legitimate majority rule must necessarily require the existence of structural conditions above 
and beyond the principle of majority. A majority cannot, using democratic means, abolish 
future elections or disenfranchise a minority.
135
 Dworkin endorses a constitutional conception 
of democracy that consists of three conditions: i) ‘a majority or plurality of people’; ii) ‘all 
citizens have the moral independence necessary to participate in the political decision as free 
moral agents’; iii) ‘the political process is such as to treat all citizens with equal concern’.136 
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The problem is that these structural conditions correspond to basic liberal principles of 
popular sovereignty, political participation, and citizen equality. None of the criteria is 
manifestly democratic. Moreover, Dworkin does not distinguish between different types of 
democracies (e.g. Western, transitional, authoritarian etc.). Instead, Dworkin’s ‘naïve 
universalism’ lies in inducing absolute principles of democracy from US constitutional 
principles.
137
 
The third and final step is to theorise democracy on its own terms. Jürgen Habermas 
rejects Dworkin’s liberal-individual, and its rival republican-communitarian,138 model of 
democracy in favour of a ‘procedural’ one. Sovereignty is generally conceived, with Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, as harnessing the general will of a collective subject. However, in 
Habermas’ terms popular sovereignty becomes ‘desubstantialised’, anonymised, and realised 
‘through the communicative presuppositions and procedures of an institutionally 
differentiated opinion- and will-formation’.139 By forcing popular sovereignty into 
‘subjectless forms of communication’ and democratic procedures140 Habermas wrestles the 
concept from Rousseau and secures it as ‘the hinge between the system of rights and the 
construction of a constitutional democracy’.141 ‘The democratic process bears the entire 
burden of legitimation’ by securing the private autonomy of legal subjects through individual 
rights and their public autonomy through communicative freedoms.
142
 
Habermas’ subjectless forms of communication have a liberal as well as a democratic 
component. On the one hand, they form the legal foundation for a free and open process of 
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participation for constructing political will and opinion, which is indispensable for 
democratic freedom. On the other hand, they form the agreement on which to disagree by 
cutting short the infinite search for validity and justification criteria. The rights of 
communication determine the democratic character of the state and its laws and practices, but 
are themselves immune from democratic deliberation. 
Both Dworkin and Habermas reject the simplistic maxim of the political constitution 
that any law properly enacted by the legislature is presumptively democratic. Instead of 
Dworkin’s structural conditions, Habermas inserts his discourse principle according to which 
‘the only law that counts as legitimate is one that could be rationally accepted by all citizens 
in a discursive process of opinion- and will-formation.’143 This axiom bears a striking 
resemblance to Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’, which ‘may be shared by citizens as a basis of a 
reasoned, informed, and willing political agreement’.144 But where does this leave the 
expression of viewpoints that are not subject to rational acceptance or reasoned and informed 
political participation? What implications do these positions have, for instance, for the 
government’s definition of extremism as 
‘the vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, 
the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs’?145 
What makes these ‘British’ values fundamental is, presumably, that they are 
susceptible to rational acceptance by all (current and future) citizens as a basis for reasoned 
and informed political agreement, in accordance with Habermas and Rawls. But what about 
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those advocates who are vocally and actively opposed to such values? Is there not a danger 
that, as one newspaper headline put it, ‘laws against “extremism” risk criminalising us all’?146 
Eric Heinze’s claims are more targeted. He does not refer to all democracies, but only 
to longstanding, stable, and prosperous democracies (LSPDs). He does not argue for an 
absolute freedom of speech, and he accepts many familiar limits on expression.
147
 His 
argument is limited to the expression of ‘viewpoints’ aired within open, public discourse, 
including irrational, obnoxious, and even dangerous worldviews. Crucially, the expression of 
such views ought to be protected as the prerogative of every citizen, rather than as a liberal 
right or as an individual freedom. He proposes elements of citizenship, which, unlike 
standard corpuses of individual rights or freedoms, can never legitimately be subject to 
legislative or judicial balancing of interests on specifically democratic grounds. Governments 
may legitimately impose certain viewpoint-neutral restraints, for instance regarding 
commercial fraud, courtroom perjury, or official secrets, and ‘time, manner, and place 
restrictions’.148 However, Heinze’s central thesis is that ‘the most distinctly democratic’ 
manifestation of free expression is viewpoint absolutism within public discourse,
149
 and that 
‘…no conceivable abridgement of that citizen prerogative could ever be deemed to promote 
democracy’.150  
If Heinze’s argument is correct then the real threat to the specifically democratic 
element of a state—as opposed to threats to any state simply as a state, such as war, famine, 
or environmental pollution—stems from laws seeking to gag the citizens’ prerogative to 
speak – which is precisely the issue in Hammond, Abdul, and related cases. Similarly, from a 
civil liberties perspective, retaining the more standard constructs of higher-order rights, 
                                                          
146
 P Johnston, ‘Laws against “extremism” risk criminalising us all’, Daily Telegraph, 28 September 2015.  
147
 Heinze, above n 15, p 41. 
148
 Heinze, above n 15, pp 45, 208-9. 
149
 Heinze, above n 15, pp 45-55; 81-83. 
150
 Heinze, above n 15, pp 77. 
30 
 
David Feldman rejects any suggestion that democracy assumes an unhindered power on the 
part of lawmakers to abridge such rights 
‘…it would be perverse to argue that there is anything undemocratic about a 
restriction on the capacity of decision-makers to interfere with the rights which are 
fundamental to democracy itself’.151 
It does not follow from the above that any limitation of the expression of a viewpoint, 
for instance through hate speech bans, would wholly diminish the legitimacy of that 
democracy. Although bans are illegitimate within LSPDs, they delegitimise democracy only 
pro tanto. ‘The legitimacy of the entire democracy is not overcome by one defect. Nor, 
however, does a democracy’s overall legitimacy suffice to overcome the defect’.152 
All three theories of democracy, by Dworkin, Habermas, and Heinze, serve as a better 
vantage point for the discussion of UK constitutional law than the ‘political’ and ‘common 
law’ models. All three argue in unison that certain norms must be presupposed in any account 
of contemporary democratic authority and must lie beyond majoritarian politics. However, 
the three accounts ultimately differ. Dworkin’s account of democracy is congruent with the 
liberal tradition that regards the constitution is a corset for those who wield power, and which 
conceives rights negatively, individually, and instrumentally. More abstractly, Habermas 
rests democracy in the communicative conditions necessary for political participation and 
will-formation. More concretely, Heinze argues for the expression of all viewpoints as a 
prerogative of citizens in LSPDs. Neither Habermas nor Heinze view the constitutive norms 
of democracy as ‘corsets’ on a free political discourse. Instead, such norms substantiate ‘the 
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necessary condition for having any discourse at all about how purposes are to be fulfilled in 
that society’.153 
Conclusion 
Not all violations of constitutional principles or fundamental rights need to be assessed with 
reference to democracy. Some incursions in the area of human rights and civil liberties 
(blanket discrimination or indefinite detention, or deportation which compromises the 
absolute prohibition on torture, and broad police powers) may be analysed in relation to the 
rule of law and liberal constitutionalism. But article cannot draw boundary lines that identify 
the precise conditions when specific issues such as electronic surveillance, extreme speech, or 
indefinite detention cease to be compatible with the principle of democracy. In addition. 
compliance with devolution, and membership of the European Union and Council of Europe 
may be scrutinised with respect to Elliott’s useful concept of constitutionality.154  
However, the prevention or criminalisation of offensive, obnoxious, or dangerous 
speech, without any security implications, raises separate and conspicuous issues for the UK 
as a contemporary democracy. The cases of Hammond and Abdul are paradigmatic. The 
defendants were arrested and fined for airing their personal views on same-sex relationships 
and the actions of UK soldiers in Iraq. The problem was not with how they said it; it was with 
what they said. If ‘there simply is no way that the speaker can express this core belief without 
risking such offence’, then the message is very clear ‘that society will not tolerate the public 
expression of his core beliefs’.155 Viewpoint absolutism is, according to Heinze, the 
irreducible core of democratic legitimacy.
156
 Criminalising the expression of viewpoints, 
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therefore, resonates throughout the legal and political system as a general challenge to 
parliamentary sovereignty and the common law, and as a particular challenge to democratic 
legitimacy.  
Asking what democracy requires in Hammond, Abdul, and similar cases, is more 
principled than trading-off freedom of expression against the need to maintain public order 
within the framework of liberal constitutionalism. Criminalising non-violent free speech may 
not be against UK law. But it ought to contravene Art 10 ECHR, and it most certainly 
contravenes the criteria of democratic legitimacy. Hammond and Abdul illustrate not only 
damage done to individual rights and freedoms, but to the democratic credentials of the polis 
itself.
157
  
The legality of legislation will always depend on sovereign authority and formal 
procedure (highest might), but its legitimacy ought to derive from persuasion and social 
generality (highest right). The democratic legitimacy of laws stems from a complex 
constellation of requirements and conditions that no longer involves popular sovereignty 
alone, but also basic rights and liberties; not an overriding concern with public order, but an 
overriding concern with freedom; not just formal participatory rights, but an inclusive process 
of opinion- and will-formation; and not just the negative, individualist, and liberal view of 
freedom as non-interference guaranteed by the rule of law, but the social and public 
conception of non-domination in a free, civic, and democratic society. All of this is known. 
The untechnical phrase ‘constitutional law’ does not reflect it; Parliament’s unqualified right 
to enact whatever law it thinks fit undermines it.  
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